Trumps Florida Documents Case Dismissed
Judge Eileen Cannon dismissed the case against the former president, citing Constitutional issues with the appointment of Special Counsel Jack Smith.
U.S. District Judge Aileen Cannon has dismissed the national defense documents case against former President Donald Trump, ruling that the appointment of special counsel Jack Smith was illegal. This decision, which came on the opening day of the Republican National Convention, marks a major victory for Trump and raises questions about the future of other legal proceedings against him.
The ruling follows an assassination attempt on Trump over the weekend and has already prompted Trump to call for the dismissal of all remaining cases against him. The case dismissal is expected to move to the 11th Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals for potential further review.
Appointments Clause Interpretation
Judge Cannon's decision to dismiss the indictment was substantially based on her interpretation of the Appointments Clause1. The court found that Special Counsel Jack Smith's appointment violated this clause, as it did not involve the President's nomination and Senate confirmation. Judge Cannon stated, “The Superseding Indictment is DISMISSED because Special Counsel Smith’s appointment violates the Appointments Clause of the United States Constitution”. According to the judge, the appointment of Smith as an "inferior officer" lacked statutory backing necessary for the Attorney General to confer such powers.
The court relied on a rigid interpretation of the clause, emphasizing, “None of the statutes cited as legal authority for the appointment—28 U.S.C. §§ 509, 510, 515, 5332—gives the Attorney General broad inferior-officer appointing power or bestows upon him the right to appoint a federal officer with the kind of prosecutorial power wielded by Special Counsel Smith”. This assertion appears to neglect the clear statutory authority vested in the DoJ by Congress, and the practical reality that the Department of Justice has historically appointed special counsels under similar statutory frameworks without comparable constitutional challenges.
Appropriations Clause Violation
In addition to the Appointments Clause, Judge Cannon ruled that the funding for Special Counsel Smith's office violated the Appropriations Clause. The court found that the funds used were drawn without explicit statutory authorization, leading to an unconstitutional expenditure. The judge wrote, “Special Counsel Smith’s use of a permanent indefinite appropriation also violates the Appropriations Clause, U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 7”3.
Critics might argue that the use of permanent indefinite appropriations within the Department of Justice for funding special counsels has been a common and accepted practice, dating back to earlier investigations such as those led by Special Counsels like Robert Mueller. The selective scrutiny applied in this case could be seen as an effort to reinterpret established financial practices, potentially setting a new and more restrictive precedent. This deviation from established norms without a clear statutory directive may signal judicial overreach.
Historical and Statutory Context
Judge Cannon meticulously analyzed the statutes cited for Smith's appointment (28 U.S.C. §§ 509, 510, 515, 533), concluding that none provided the Attorney General with the authority to appoint a special counsel with Smith’s extensive prosecutorial powers. She wrote, “Both the Appointments and Appropriations challenges as framed in the Motion raise the following threshold question: is there a statute in the United States Code that authorizes the appointment of Special Counsel Smith to conduct this prosecution? After careful study of this seminal issue, the answer is no”.
This interpretation is excessively rigid and literal, failing to account for the broader context and the practical necessity for flexibility in appointing special prosecutors. Historically, these statutes have been employed without such constitutional objections, suggesting that the court's ruling may represent a departure from both legal tradition and the functional needs of the Justice Department.
The ruling did not sufficiently address why Smith's appointment, following similar procedures and regulations as those in previous high-profile cases, warranted unique constitutional challenges, when Smith’s appointment is consistent with the historical appointment of special counsels by the DOJ.
In previous instances, special counsels like Robert Mueller were appointed under the same Department of Justice regulations (28 C.F.R. §§ 600.1-600.104), which provide that the Attorney General has the authority to appoint outside counsel when necessary. The lack of a clear statutory distinction in Smith's case is invigorates the claims of Cannon’s bias in favor of Trump, or at the least an attempt to establish a new legal precedent that does not align with established practices.
Judge Cannon's rulings on the Appointments Clause and Appropriations Clause violations in dismissing the indictment against Trump exhibit legal rigor but seem selectively applied. The decision challenges long-standing practices and introduces a heightened level of scrutiny that could have significant implications for the future appointment and operation of special counsels.
The court’s approach, focusing on an overly strict statutory interpretation, appears to neglect the historical flexibility afforded to the Department of Justice in managing special investigations. Additionally, Congress has vested the DOJ with the authority in statute to appoint officers like Smith. The ruling suggests a deviation from established norms and practices without substantial statutory basis, raising concerns about the precedent it sets for future cases.
The emphasis on the specific method of appointment and funding, while ignoring historical context, statutory authority, and practical necessity, undermines the functionality of the Justice Department's ability to conduct independent investigations into executive branch misconduct.
The Appointments Clause is located in Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution. It prescribes the exclusive means for appointing "Officers of the United States," requiring that principal officers be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. Congress may vest the appointment of inferior officers in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments.
28 U.S.C. §§ 509, 510, 515, and 533 are statutes within the United States Code that outline certain powers and functions of the Attorney General and the Department of Justice. Section 509 vests all functions of other officers and agencies of the Department of Justice in the Attorney General. Section 510 allows the Attorney General to delegate his or her functions to other officers, employees, or agencies within the Department. Section 515 permits the Attorney General to specially appoint attorneys to conduct legal proceedings on behalf of the United States. Section 533 authorizes the Attorney General to appoint officials to detect and prosecute crimes against the United States, among other investigative responsibilities.
Article I, Section 9, Clause 7 of the United States Constitution, also known as the Appropriations Clause, states: "No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time." This clause ensures that federal funds cannot be spent without a specific appropriation by Congress, serving as a key mechanism for congressional control over government spending and maintaining the separation of powers.
28 C.F.R. §§ 600.1-600.10 are the regulations governing the appointment, jurisdiction, and authority of Special Counsels within the Department of Justice. These regulations, issued by the Attorney General, outline the procedures for appointing a Special Counsel (§ 600.1), define the scope of their jurisdiction (§ 600.4), and provide them with the authority to conduct investigations and prosecutions independently of the Department's day-to-day oversight (§ 600.6). The regulations also specify the circumstances under which a Special Counsel can be removed (§ 600.7) and require that the Special Counsel adhere to the rules, regulations, and policies of the Department of Justice (§ 600.7(a)).